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The employment-at-will doctrine, which creates the presumption
that employment is terminable at the option of either the employer or
employee, developed in the United States at the end of the nineteenth
century.' This doctrine originally was adopted to protect employees,
who previously stood to forfeit all wages, including those for time actu-
ally worked, if they failed to work the entire time for which they were
hired.2 Until recently, South Carolina followed this general rule;3 in ab-
sence of a written contract provision to the contrary, employees could
be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason.4 Courts
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1. See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privi-
lege, 21 IDAHo L. REV. 201, 202 (1985). The employment-at-will doctrine was a departure
from earlier Anglo-Saxon law. From the fourteenth to mid-eighteenth century, servants
were hired by the year and could not be discharged except for reasonable cause. See id.
at 203.
2. See Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption that Employ-
ment is Terminable At-Will, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 219, 227 (1986-1987).
3. See, e.g., Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951); John-
son v. American Ry. Express Co., 163 S.C. 191, 161 S.E. 473 (1931).
4. See, e.g., Witte v. Brasington, 125 F. Supp. 784 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Todd v. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981). In Witte the
South Carolina District Court stated that when the employment contract did not specify
a definite period, the contract was terminable at will by either party. 125 F. Supp. at 786.
This rule applied even if the contract expressly provided for employment "permanently"
or "so long as the employee's services shall be properly performed." See Orsini, 219 S.C.
at 277, 64 S.E.2d at 879; see also Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259
S.E.2d 812 (1979) (obligation of service to be performed does not change employee's at-
will status).
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carved out one exception: if the employee gave independent considera-
tion in addition to the performance of services, employment could be
terminated only for cause.5
In 1987 the South Carolina Supreme Court modified the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine by holding that promissory language found in
employee manuals or handbooks issued by employers to their employ-
ees may obligate employers to act according to those promises.6 Under
this exception, if the employee can satisfy the contractual require-
ments of offer, acceptance, and consideration, the employer's unilateral
pronouncements of personnel policies become binding and modify the
terms and conditions of employment.
In addition, one South Carolina District Court judge indicated
that an employer may not later modify the contract created by a man-
ual by issuing a revised handbook deleting the discharge provisions un-
less it shows that the revised handbook also satisfies all requirements
of a valid contract. 7 Under that concept, an employer may be required
to provide additional consideration to support the modification beyond
the employee's returning to work after the employer issues the modi-
fied handbook.8 This portion of the court's decision appears to be an
aberration, and it is contrary to subsequent Fourth Circuit law.
As a consequence of the change of law in this area, employers and
employees in South Carolina cannot be sure how courts will consider
5. See Witte, 125 F. Supp. at 786; Orsini, 219 S.C. at 276, 64 S.E.2d at 879. In
Orsini the plaintiff asserted that he had given additional consideration because he and
his wife moved from Atlanta to Columbia, thereby giving up their jobs, school, church
friends, and social affiliation. Id. at 275-76, 64 S.E.2d at 879-80. The court rejected this
argument and held that no additional consideration had been given. Id.; see also Gainey
v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486 (1955) (employee's forbear-
ance from pursuing workers' compensation claim was not sufficient consideration to cre-
ate a contract for permanent employment).
In both Orsini and Witte, the contracts provided for a percentage basis of compen-
sation. Both courts rejected the plaintiff's allegation that this constituted additional
compensation:
[The general rule] is followed notwithstanding [that] the contract of employ-
ment provides for ... payment based on a percent of the profits of the busi-
ness in which the services are being rendered, or for transfer to the employee
of specified property or an interest therein if profits in a certain amount are
realized.
Witte, 125 F. Supp. at 787; see also Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936)
(although the plaintiff gave up plan to engage in the same business as independent
dealer and sold his property as a result, he did not give additional consideration).
6. See Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). For an
excellent discussion of this case, see Labor Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law,
1988, 40 S.C.L. REV. 157, 157-60 (1988).
7. See Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.S.C. 1989).
8. Id. at 1236.
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EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
handbooks they adopt. They are not alone, however, as courts through-
out the country have faced this issue in recent years, and widely differ-
ent decisions and reasoning have emerged. A brief look at some of the
more influential decisions helps one to understand more clearly how
and why the present dilemma arose and what the future may bring in
this area.
Currently, the majority of state courts have recognized that an em-
ployee may be entitled to certain rights and privileges as a result of
certain provisions found in employee handbooks or policies distributed
by an employer to its employees. Such decisions, which are becoming
increasingly prevalent, represent another means by which courts, as
well as legislatures, are attempting to circumvent the long-standing
employment-at-will doctrine.
Employers are finding it difficult to understand how courts have
taken basic principles of contract law and applied them to employee
handbooks, thereby creating a viable exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine. Even more confusing is how courts have used disclaimers
included in employee handbooks to limit the extent to which hand-
books may be interpreted as terms of an employment agreement. Addi-
tionally, the manner and method in which the courts determine dam-
ages in such cases raise interesting problems that warrant evaluation.
This Article will present an overview of the law in employee handbook
cases, discuss the issues raised by employer modifications and dis-
claimers to the handbooks, and discuss damages in such cases.
II. EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS
The essential elements of a valid contract include offer, accept-
ance, and bargained-for consideration. Many courts have found that
statements of an employer's policies given to employees in an employee
handbook create binding unilateral contracts.
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield9 is generally acknowledged
as the first case to recognize a cause of action for violation of a com-
pany handbook. In this case the Michigan Supreme Court held that:
(1) [A] provision of an employment contract providing that an em-
ployee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable
although the contract is not for a definite term-the term is "indefi-
nite," and
(2) [S]uch a provision may become a part of the contract either by
express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an employee's le-
gitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy statements."0
9. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
10. Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
1991]
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In Toussaint employees inquired about job security when the company
hired them. In response, the company told the employees that their
jobs. were secure as long as they performed well. These oral assurances,
according to the court, were reaffirmed by statements in the policy
manual indicating that employees would be discharged only for cause.
The Michigan Supreme Court, finding that these statements amounted
to unilateral contracts, stated that the "just cause" provision of the
employee handbook "can give rise to contractual rights in employees
without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy
statements would create contractual rights in the employee, . . . al-
though no reference was made to the policy statement in pre-employ-
ment interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until
after his hiring."'1 Under the rule expressed in Toussaint, when an em-
ployer has provided in its employee handbook that employees are to be
terminated only for cause, the employer's decision to terminate the
employee for poor performance is subject to judicial review: "The jury
as trier of facts decides whether the employee was, in fact, discharged
for unsatisfactory work.'
2
Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital"3 is one of the few
cases that closely follows Toussaint. In Jones the plaintiff, an at-will
employee, did not receive an employee handbook until several years
after the time she was hired. This initial handbook was revised, and
the plaintiff received a new handbook several years later which pro-
vided that employees would be terminated only for good cause.' 4 The
Alaska Supreme Court, relying on Toussaint, held that employee pol-
icy manuals may modify employment-at-will agreements and whether
such a manual has modified an at-will employment agreement is a
case-by-case question of fact for the jury.
5
Several courts have criticized Toussaint for abandoning tradi-
tional contract principles in favor of'advancing social policy, thus al-
lowing judicial discretion to be substituted for business discretion
when making employment personnel decisions. In Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp.16 a Florida appellate court refused to adopt the theory
that policy statements by an employer can give rise to an enforceable
11. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
12. Id. at 621, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
13. 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
14. Id. at 784-85.
15. Id. at 787; see also Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 728
S.W.2d 501 (1987) (recognizing that a hospital manual altered the terms of a nurse's
employment and set forth explicit grounds for termination and provided a procedure for
termination).
16. 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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contract without the parties' explicit mutual agreement. 17 The Muller
court sharply criticized Toussaint and stated:
We would have serious 'reservations as to the advisability of relaxing
the requirements of definiteness in employment contracts considering
the concomitant uncertainty which would result in employer-em-
ployee relationships. A basic function of the law is to foster certainty
in business relationships, not to create uncertainty by establishing
ambivalent criteria for the construction of those relationships."'
In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell"9 the Alabama Supreme
Court in a well-reasoned opinion refused to follow Toussaint. The
court noted its reluctance to abandon traditional contract principles 0
and, instead, utilized traditional principles of contract law" to formu-
late guidelines to determine when language in a handbook is sufficient
to constitute an offer to create a binding unilateral contract:
First, the language contained in the handbook must be examined to
see if it is specific enough to constitute an offer. Second, the offer
must have been communicated to the employee by issuance of the
handbook... . Third, the employee must have accepted the offer by
retaining employment after he has become generally aware of the of-
fer. His actual performance supplies the necessary consideration.
2 2
In Spero v. Lockwood, Inc.23 the Idaho Supreme Court refused to
enforce policy statements in an employee personnel manual that the
employer distributed to its employees several years after the plaintiff
was hired. The court noted that the manual was never communicated
to the plaintiff, that sufficient evidence did not exist to show the plain-
tiff ever relied on or read the terms of the manual, and that it ap-
peared from the evidence that the plaintiff obtained the manual
fortuitously.'
4
In Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.25 the Missouri Supreme
Court also relied upon traditional contract elements of offer, accept-
ance, and consideration to hold that the provisions of an employee
handbook do not give rise to a contract. The court stated that in this
17. Id. at 270.
18. Id.
19. 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987).
20. Id. at 731 n.2.
21. "Whether a handbook can become part of the employment contract raises such
issues of contract formation as offer and acceptance and consideration." Id. at 731 (quot-
ing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. 1983)).
22. Id. at 735.
23. 111 Idaho 74, 721 P.2d 174 (1986).
24. Id. at 75, 721 P.2d at 175.
25. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
1991]
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situation, none of the traditional elements of a contract were present:
The employer published its personnel manual for informational pur-
poses only and not as a contractual offer to its employees. The court
also noted the general nature of the language in the handbook and that




Georgia courts also have refused to recognize a cause of action for
violation of an employee handbook. In Lane v. K-Mart Corp.,'7 relying
on the traditional employment-at-will doctrine, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that in the absence of a definite period of employment in
the manual, employment is terminable at the will of either party for
any reason or no reason at all.
28
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille0 is one of the most frequently
cited opinions used to resolve the legal issues presented by employee
handbooks. In this case, the defendant filed a counterclaim against the
plaintiff bank that had sued the defendant, a former employee, for fail-
ure to pay off two bank loans.30 The handbook at issue called for a
progressive disciplinary policy consisting of reprimands for the first
and second offenses and discharge or suspension for the third offense.
The handbook also contained a provision about job security that, in
general terms, noted the security of jobs in the banking industry.31 The
bank terminated the defendant without following the progressive dis-
charge procedure, however .3 The Minnesota Supreme Court carefully
analyzed the elements of the unilateral contract:
Generally speaking, a promise of employment on particular terms of
unspecified duration, if in [the] form [of] an offer, and if accepted by
the employee, may create a binding unilateral contract. The offer
26. Id. at 662; see also Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del.
1982) (employer manual that did not grant to any employee a specific term of employ-
ment was a unilateral statement of the employer's policies for the benefit of its employ-
ees and did not alter the employee's at-will status); McConnel v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
499 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("Unilateral policy statements cannot, with-
out more, give rise to enforceable contract rights.").
27. 190 Ga. App. 113, 378 S.E.2d 136 (1989).
28. Id. at 113-14, 378 S.E.2d at 137.
29. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
30. Id. at 625.
31. Id. at 625-26. The portion of Pine River State Bank's handbook entitled Job
Security included the following language:
Employment in the banking industry is very stable. It does not fluctuate up
and down sharply in good times and bad, as do many other types of employ-
ment. We have no seasonal layoffs and we never hire a lot of people when
business is booming only to release them when things are not as active.
Id. at 626 n.2.
32. Id. at 630-31.
[Vol. 42
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must be definite in form and must be communicated to the offeree.
Whether a proposal is meant to be an offer for a unilateral contract is
determined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not by their
subjective intentions. An employer's general statements of policy are
no more than that and do not meet the contractual requirements for
an offer.33
The court then held that provisions in an employee handbook may be-
come enforceable only if they meet the requirements of a unilateral
contract.3 4 The court determined that the employer communicated to
its employees a progressive disciplinary procedure which established a
specific three-step procedure for terminations. Furthermore, the court
found that the defendant's continued performance of his job consti-
tuted acceptance of this offer.3 5 The court noted, however, that the job
security provision of the handbook was "no more than a general state-
ment of policy.
'36
In Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center3 7 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue of whether
the provisions of an employee handbook could form the basis of a con-
tract between an employer and employee.3 The Illinois Supreme
Court, following the reasoning in Pine River, held that if the tradi-
tional requirements for contract formation are present, employee
handbooks or other policy statements could create enforceable contract
rights. The court held that:
First, the language of the policy statement must contain a promise
clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer
has been made. Second, the statement must be disseminated to the
employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents
and reasonably believes it to be an offer. Third, the employee must
accept the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning
of the policy statement. When these conditions are present, then the
employee's continued work constitutes consideration for the promises
33. Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id. at'630. The court concluded that a more stable and productive work force
constituted the consideration which the bank received. Id.
36. Id.; see also Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. 1986) (employee handbook that provides for discharge for seri-
ous offenses but fails to provide detailed or definite disciplinary procedures does not
contain sufficiently definite terms to create a binding unilateral contract); Kulkay v. Al-
lied Cent. Stores, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (employee hired for
indefinite term may maintain action of breach of contract if the policy provisions in an
employee handbook are not followed, provided the offer is sufficiently definite in form
and more than an employer's general statement of policy).
37. 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
38. Id. at 488, 505 N.E.2d at 317.
1991]
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contained in the statement, and under traditional principles a valid
contract is formed.39
In Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan ° the Colorado Supreme
Court set forth similar guidelines to determine when a handbook can
create an enforceable contractual obligation. The court held that an
employee initially hired as an employee-at-will may be able to enforce
the provisions of an employee handbook under general contract princi-
ples. If the employee can demonstrate that the company's employee
manual constituted an offer on behalf of the employer to the employee
and can establish that the employee's initial or continued employment
constituted acceptance of and consideration for the offer, then the
handbook justifiably may give rise to contractual rights.4 1
The court also held that an employee could enforce the provisions
of an employee handbook under a promissory estoppel theory. Specifi-
cally, if the employee "can demonstrate that the employer should rea-
sonably have expected the employee to consider the employee manual
as a commitment from the employer to follow the termination proce-
dures, that the employee reasonably relied on the termination proce-
dures to his detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the termination procedures," then a cause of action may
lie.
4 2
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court relied upon promissory estop-
pel principles in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. 4 3 In Mers the plaintiff
contended that he was discharged without good cause, in violation of
the provisions in the defendant's employee handbook and contrary to
the oral representations made to the plaintiff by the defendant's
agents.44 The court held that the facts and circumstances "including
the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing be-
tween the parties, company policy, or any other fact" may be consid-
ered by the trier of fact in order to determine the explicit and implicit
terms of the agreement between the parties.
4
5
39. Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
40. 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
41. Id. at 711.
42. Id. at 712; see also Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 483
N.E.2d 150, 155 (1985) ("Where appropriate, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is ap-
plicable and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements.").
43. 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
44. Id. at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152.
45. Id. at 104, 483 N.E.2d at 154; see also Leikvold v. Valley View Community
Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688 P.2d 170, 174 (1984) (en banc) ("Whether any particular
personnel manual modifies any particular employment-at-will relationship and becomes
part of the particular employment contract is a question of fact. Evidence relevant to
this factual decision includes the language used in the personnel manual as well as the
[Vol. 42
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The Washington Supreme Court has held that if an employer cre-
ates an "atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises
of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced
thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment,
those promises are enforceable components of the employment
relationship.'
46
III. MODIFICATIONS AND DIsCLAIMRS
Many jurisdictions have, in one form or another, recognized that
provisions in employee handbooks may become legally binding.
Whether an employer can unilaterally modify the handbook to provide
for employment-at-will, however, remains unclear. One of the most in-
triguing decisions on this subject is a South Carolina District Court
opinion, Toth v. Square D Co.47 In Toth several laid-off employees
brought a breach of contract action against the employer alleging that
the employer had failed to follow the terms of its employee handbook
in administering the layoffs. The employer moved for summary judg-
ment against the plaintiffs discharged after July 1, 1986, the date on
which the employer added the following revision to its handbook:
"This booklet is not intended to create any contractual rights in favor
of the employee or Company. The Company reserves the right to
change the terms of this booklet at any time.'
48
All of the laid-off employees admitted that they received a revised
handbook and signed an acknowledgment evidencing their receipt of
the revision.49 Nevertheless, the court held that a unilateral contract
based on an employee handbook must be comprised of the essential
elements of any contract, including mutual assent to be bound, which
is usually demonstrated by an offer and acceptance of that offer in ex-
change for valuable consideration.50 The court first stated that the
employer's course of conduct . . ").
46. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
(1984) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (language in an employer's policy and procedural
guide that reflects that employees would be treated fairly, establishes employer evalua-
tion procedures, and states promotions would come from within the company, does not
establish an implied contract that employee would be terminated only for cause). Id. at
224, 685 P.2d at 1085.
47. 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989).
48. Id. at 1234. (quoting from Square D Company's handbook, Salaried Employee
Handbook).
49. Id. The acknowledgement stated: "'This will acknowledge receipt of Square
D's Employee Handbook as revised on July 1, 1986. I recognize it is my responsibility to
read the handbook and understand the policies and procedures set forth in it.'" Id.
(quoting from Square D Company's handbook, Salaried Employee Handbook).
50. Id. at 1235. The court strictly adhered to traditionally recognized principles of
1991]
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plaintiffs had not received any new consideration in return for the
modification of the employee handbook. The court further held that
whether the plaintiffs accepted the terms of the handbook by continu-
ing to work for the employer after receiving the disclaimer was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to decide.51
Prior to Toth, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Small v.
Springs Industries, Inc. (Springs !),52 had recognized that provisions
in an employee handbook could create enforceable contract rights. In
Springs I the court held that a handbook created a unilateral contract
and that an employer's promise or offer constituted an employment
agreement. The court further stated that an employee's "action or for-
bearance in reliance on [the employer's] promise was sufficient consid-
eration to make the promise legally binding," noting that under South
Carolina law, at-will employment constitutes sufficient consideration to
support an employment contract.53 Following the reasoning in Springs
I, when an employer modifies its handbook to provide for employment-
at-will, subsequent job performance by the employee will serve as suffi-
cient consideration to support the contract modification.5 4 Accordingly,
the Toth court's determination that a jury should decide whether an
employee's continued work performance is valid consideration for the
modification appears inconsistent with the Springs I holding. 5
5
Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,56 is a recent decision
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, contrary to Toth, holds
that an employee's continued work after the modification of an em-
contract formation in order to prevent unilateral modifications of employment contracts.
The court felt that such modifications would enable employers to circumvent the safe-
guards established by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Small v. Springs Indus.,
Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). 712 F. Supp. at 1235.
51. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1236.
52. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
53. Id. at 484, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
54. The Springs I court stated:
If an employer wishes to issue policies, manuals, or bulletins as purely advisory
statements with no intent of being bound by them and with a desire to con-
tinue under the employment at will policy, he certainly is free to do so. This
could be accomplished merely by inserting a conspicuous disclaimer or provi-
sion into the written document.
Id. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).
55. See Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 I.E.R. (BNA) 1453, 1457 (S.C.
Ct. C.P. 1989) (employee's returning to work after the inclusion of disclaimers in an
employee handbook to ensure employment-at-will constitutes sufficient consideration
and acceptance of the modification of existing policies); see also Blankenship v. South
Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 5 I.E.R. (BNA) 930, 933 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1990) (employee contin-
uing to work after handbook had been modified to include a random drug testing policy
is sufficient consideration to enforce the modification of existing policies).
56. 933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 42
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ployee handbook is sufficient consideration to enforce an employee
handbook issued after hire. In this case, the plaintiff filed suit against
the employer for breach of an implied at-will contract, basing his claim
upon Westinghouse's employee handbook that was in effect at the time
the plaintiff began working there. After the plaintiff was hired, West-
inghouse amended the handbook to state expressly that the handbook
shall not be construed by employees to constitute the terms of a con-
tract. The plaintiff contended that since the disclaimer was added to
the manual after he was hired, it did not apply to him.
The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff's continuing to work af-
ter the modification of the handbook constituted sufficient considera-
tion to enforce the disclaimer.57 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit ex-
plained that:
This view comports with the expectations of employees and employ-
ers. All employees expect to be covered by the personnel policies of
the company in existence at the time of their current work, not when
they were hired 20 years ago. . . Moreover, an employer expects to
treat all its employees according to the same basic benefit rules, and
not apply a hodgepodge of rules based on the starting date of the
employee."8
Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hospital,59 like Toth, is one
of the few cases in which the court found that a subsequent modifica-
tion to an employee handbook may be ineffective. In Jones the em-
ployer initially hired the plaintiff in 1971 as a registered nurse. Several
years later, the employer distributed a personnel manual that provided
termination for cause and a grievance procedure. In 1978 the employer
issued a second manual that exempted supervisory employees from the
grievance procedure, but provided that nonprobationary employees
would be terminated only for cause.6 0 The second manual also included
a disclaimer stating that the manual was not a contract of employment
between the employee and employer." The court held that the one-
sentence disclaimer followed by eighty-five pages of policies and regu-
lations "does not unambiguously and conspicuously inform the em-
ployee that the manual is not part of the employee's contract of em-
ployment."62 The court also noted that the disclaimer did not
57. Id. at 240.
58. Id.
59. 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989).
60. Id. at 784-85.
61. Id. at 787.
62. Id. at 788. The disclaimer in the 1978 manual stated: "The purpose of this
manual is to provide information to all ... employees. It is not a contract of employ-
ment nor is it incorporated in any contract of employment between [employer] and any
1991]
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specifically notify the employee that his or her employment was termi-
nable at will "with or without reason.16 3 Thus, according to the court,
the manual "creates the impression, contrary to the 'disclaimer,' that
employees are to be provided with certain job protections." 4
A more conventional approach as to whether a disclaimer suffi-
ciently nullifies the provisions in an employee handbook was set out in
Chambers v. Valley National Bank. 5 In Chambers the plaintiff was
hired in 1971, and in 1984, the Arizona Supreme Court first recognized
a handbook exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 6 Following
the court's decision, the defendant bank added a disclaimer to its
handbook.67 The court characterized the disclaimer as a modification
of a unilateral contract and implied that the plaintiff's continued em-
ployment was sufficient consideration to make the modification en-
forceable." The court also noted that it would be unreasonable for the
plaintiff to rely on the handbook granting employment that was not
terminable at will.6 9
The Michigan Supreme Court followed the logic of Chambers in
employee." Id. at 787.
63. Id. at 788.
64. Id.; see also Towns v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 3 I.E.R. (BNA) 911, 914 n.3
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (waiver signed by employee several months after he started work for
employer is void because no evidence exists that plaintiff received additional considera-
tion for signing the waiver). But see Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268,
272, 549 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (1988) (Under Ohio law, an employee handbook will alter an
at-will employment relationship only if the employer and employee have agreed to create
a contract from the writing. A disclaimer stating that the provisions of a handbook are
not intended to create a contract is sufficient evidence to show no mutual assent between
the parties).
65. 721 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Ariz. 1988).
66. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170
(1984). The Chambers court stated:
[I]f an employer issues a personnel policy manual or handbook upon which its
employees may reasonably rely, the employer may not treat the contents of
these documents as illusory, because the employer's representations in the per-
sonnel manual then become terms of the employment contract and limit the
employer's ability to discharge the employee.
721 F. Supp. at 1130.
67..The relevant portions of the disclaimer provided: "[T]he contents of this hand-
book DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE TERMS OF A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.
Nothing contained in this handbook should be construed as a guarantee of continued
employment, but rather, employment with the Bank is on an 'at will' basis."
Chambers, 721 F. Supp. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 1131-32.
69. Id. at 1131; see also Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 734
(Ala. 1987) ("[I]f the employer does not wish the policies contained in an employee
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Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. (In re Certified Question).70 In
Bankey the court addressed the issue of "whether a written discharge-
for-cause policy may be modified by the employer without explicit res-
ervation at the outset of the right to do sO.'71 Instead of relying on a
unilateral contract theory, the court analyzed the issue by focusing on
the benefits that accrue to an employer when desirable personnel poli-
cies are established. The court held that it would be unreasonable, if
not illogical, to require an employer to renegotiate v.ith each of its em-
ployees every time it desired to change one of its policies. The court
also noted that prohibiting an employer from unilaterally modifying
the provisions of its employee handbook would cause many employers
to "be tied to anachronistic policies in perpetuity merely because they
did not have the foresight to anticipate the court's Toussaint decision
by expressly reserving at the outset the right to make policy
changes. "72
A renegotiation requirement, moreover, would have a negative ef-
fect on the uniformity of employer policies.7 3 The court ultimately held
that the only requirement for the revocation of a discharge-for-cause
policy to become legally effective, is that "reasonable notice of the
change must be uniformly given to affected employees. '74
In Nork v. Fetter Printing Co.7 5 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
decided three closely related handbook cases. One of the plaintiffs,
Scheurich, began work with defendant Cross Motors in 1973. In 1983
Scheurich received a personnel manual which contained a disclaimer
on the last page indicating that the manual was not to be construed as
a contract of employment between the employer and employee.
Scheurich argued that the contract disclaimer should be nullified and
70. 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989).
71. Id. at 449, 443 N.W.2d at 117. The court quoted dictum from Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 618, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980), that may be
interpreted to require the employer to reserve the right to modify its handbook in ad-
vance. Bankey, 439 Mich. at 445, 443 N.W. 2d at 115.
72. 439 Mich. at 456, 443 N.W.2d at 120. Although the Michigan Supreme Court
concluded that an employer need not reserve the right in advance to modify its hand-
book, it cautioned against changes made in bad faith. Moreover, the court continued,
"[flairness suggests that a discharge-for-cause policy announced with flourishes and fan-
fare at noonday should not be revoked by a pennywhistle trill at midnight." Id. at 457,
443 N.W.2d at 120.
73. Although an employer may negotiate individually with an empoyee over the
terms and conditions of employment, an employer may run afoul of section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act if the employer attempts to negotiate with employers as a
group.
74. Bankey, 439 Mich. at 445, 443 N.W.2d at 115; see also Carlson v. Hutzel Corp.,
183 Mich. App. 508, 514, 455 N.W.2d 335, 338 (1990) (mutual assent is not required for
employer to make unilateral change to written employment policies).
75. 738 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
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that the manual should be given contract status. The court enforced
the disclaimer, however, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.7 1 Crit-
icizing the plaintiff's argument, the court stated: "If appellant's reason-
ing is thought through to its logical conclusion, virtually every policy
and procedural manual would create a contract of employment; those
without a disclaimer would because they would have no disclaimers,




In Therrien v. United Air Lines, Inc.78 a Colorado federal district
court, applying Colorado law, addressed the issue of whether a contract
disclaimer can nullify the provisions of an employee handbook under
the doctrine of implied contract and promissory estoppel. The court
noted that to prevail under the implied contract theory, the plaintiff
must show mutual assent to be bound.79 To prevail on the promissory
estoppel theory, the plaintiff must show that he reasonably relied on
the promises contained in the handbook.80 Because the handbook con-
tained a provision stating that the plaintiff's employment was at-will,
the court concluded that the plaintiff could not seriously contend that
he relied on the provisions of the handbook, nor could he show mutual
assent to be bound.81
IV. DAMAGES
Currently, only a few courts have specifically addressed the types
of damages employees may recover when employers violate the provi-
sions of an employee handbook. In Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.
(Springs 11) s2 the employer terminated the plaintiff without regard to
the termination procedures set forth in the company handbook. Ini-
tially, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the issue of
whether South Carolina law allowed an employee to recover for viola-
tions of the provisions in a company handbook.83 After the supreme
court ruled that South Carolina recognized such a cause of action, " the
76. Id. at 825-26.
77. Id. at 827.
78. 670 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987).
79. Id. at 1520-21.
80. Id. at 1521.
81. Id. at 1522-23. To statements made by plaintiff that he believed he had an
employment agreement, the court held that "[w]hile ... subjective feelings might have
some significance in other areas of the law, it is elementary under the universally ac-
cepted objective theory that they are irrelevant in contract." Id. at 1523.
82. 300 S.C. 481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
83. Springs 1, 292 S.C. at 481-86, 357 S.E.2d at 452-55.
84. Id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455. ("[A] jury can consider an employee handbook,
along with other evidence, in deciding whether the employer and employee had a limit-
[Vol. 42
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court remanded the case on the issue of damages.s
After the remand, the employer made an unconditional offer to
reinstate the plaintiff to her original position,8 but Small refused this
offer because she believed that the employer eventually would find
some way to terminate her.8 7 The defendant argued that the plaintiff's
damages should stop accruing once the employer presents an uncondi-
tional offer of reinstatement.8 The South Carolina Supreme Court dis-
agreed, however, and held that the issue of the reasonableness of the
offer of reinstatement was a question of fact that should be decided by
the jury. 9 The court held that the amount of back pay and front pay
to which the plaintiff was entitled as a result of the alleged breach of
the handbook provisions was within the sound discretion of the jury.
Thus, the court affirmed the jury's award of $100,000 in damages to the
plaintiff.90
In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille9' the Minnesota Supreme
Court faced a similar issue. In Pine River the jury found that the em-
ployer discharged the plaintiff in violation of a progressive disciplinary
procedure found in defendant's employee handbook.2 The jury
awarded damages of lost wages up to the trial date. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff should not be entitled to such an award for
damages because the employer would have discharged the plaintiff
anyway in due course. Nevertheless, the court, following traditional
contract principles and quoting prior Minnesota precedent, stated that
"[t]he measure of damages for breach of an employment contract is the
compensation which an employee who has been wrongfully discharged
would have received had the contract been carried out according to its
terms. 1 3 The court then held that the evidence supported the damages
award. 4
Other courts resolve damages issues in handbook cases with prin-
ing agreement on the employee's at-will employment status.").
85. Id. at 487, 357 S.E.2d at 455-56 (trial court jury award of $300,000 found
.,shockingly disproportionate to the injuries").
86. Springs II, 300 S.C. at 482, 388 S.E.2d at 810.
87. See id. at 487-88, 388 S.E.2d at 812.
88. Id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 811.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 812. But see Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C.
553, 389 S.E.2d 448, 449-50 (Ct. App. 1990) (South Carolina Court of Appeals, in a retali-
atory discharge case, held that lost wages and reinstatement are equitable in nature and
should be determined by the court, not the jury).
91. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
92. Id. at 624.
93. Id. at 632 (quoting Zeller v. Prior Lake Pub. Schools, 259 Minn. 487, 493, 108




Wynkoop and Moise: Employee Handbooks in South Carolina: The Employers' Dilemma
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW
ciples of equity. One case that demonstrates this approach is Stafford
v. Electronic Data Systems.9 5 The Stafford court, in determining
whether damages should be decided by the court or the jury, initially
ruled that reinstatement as a satisfactory solution to a conflict between
an employee and employer is an equitable remedy to be decided by the
court, not by the jury.90 The court then addressed the issue of whether
the availability and the amount of front pay in a handbook case are
exclusively within the province of the court, rather than the jury. After
examining a recent Sixth Circuit case in which the court allowed a de-
termination of front pay to be made by the jury,9" the court held that
in the Sixth Circuit "the issue of front pay still rests within 'the sound
discretion of the trial court.' "98 In support of its holding, the court
noted that "it is well-settled law that 'front pay' is only to be awarded
in lieu of reinstatement where reinstatement is impracticable or inade-
quate." 9 The court also stated that "the remedy of reinstatement is
. ..equitable in nature."10 0 The court concluded:
[I]t only makes sense that if reinstatement is a remedy clearly equita-
ble in nature, then its substitute-where that remedy is impractica-
ble-is likewise equitable in nature. And, if reinstatement is within
the province of the court, then its substitute-front pay-is within
the province of the court, as well. 101
The Stafford court relied heavily on the Second Circuit's reason-
ing in Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co.1°2 to substantiate its con-
clusion. 03 In Dominic the court held that an award of front pay was
equitable relief and, therefore, was within the court's province.104 The
95. 741 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (employee brought action for breach of
employment contract seeking economic damages in form of back pay and front pay).
96. Id. at 665; see also Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1984) (Sixth Circuit did not address the issue of whether the judge or jury deter-
mines reinstatement because the parties to the litigation agreed that the court decides if
reinstatement is appropriate); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022-23 (1st Cir.
1979) (district court decides whether to grant or deny reinstatement to a prevailing
plaintiff).
97. The case evaluated by the Stafford court was Fite v. First Tennessee Prod.
Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1988). Stafford, 741 F. Supp. at 665-66.
98. 741 F. Supp. at 666.
99. Id.; see Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); see also Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d
605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Future damages should not be awarded unless reinstatement is
impracticable or impossible; the district court, then, has discretion to award front pay.").
100. 741 F. Supp. at 666 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987).
103. See Stafford, 741 F. Supp. at 666-67.
104. Dominic, 822 F.2d at 1257.
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There is much overlap between the facts relevant to whether an
award of front pay is appropriate and those relevant to the size of the
award. For example, both questions turn in part on the ease with
which the employee will be able to find other employment. To divide
the fact-finding responsibilities in such circumstances would be anom-
alous and would risk inconsistent decisions. A jury might conclude
that the employee would never find other work and award a large sum
in front pay, while the judge found that he or she would find work
immediately and that no award was appropriate. Or, the judge might
find front pay appropriate, but the jury might award only a nominal
sum based on its belief that the employee could secure immediate
employment.
1 0 5
The Stafford court also relied on Chace v. Champion Spark Plug
Co.,10 in which the District Court of Maryland refused to submit the
issue of front pay to the jury in an age discrimination case. The Chace
court reasoned:
This Court is of the view that if the jury is given the issue, it will
be called upon to define a frozen image from fluid circumstances.
Rather than being given the task of performing equity based on all
the circumstances, the jury would be handed the task of computing
mechanically a front pay number without the flexibility required by
other factors which would necessarily have to be considered. For ex-
ample, the appropriate number of years to be considered in comput-
ing front pay could only be answered after reaching a full understand-
ing of the reasons why front pay might be allowed as a substitute for
reinstatement. If the Court were to attempt to instruct the jury on all
equitable factors to be considered, it would be doing no less than dele-




Aggrieved parties in a breach of contract case are entitled to be
placed in the position that they would have been in had the breach not
occurred.10 8 Factors relevant to making such a determination include
the length of time the employee otherwise would have remained em-
ployed with the company and whether the employee reasonably could
have expected increases in wages and benefits had the breach not oc-
curred. The length of time required for the employee to obtain alterna-
tive, comparable employment and whether the discharged employee
105. Id.
106. 725 F. Supp. 868 (D. Md. 1989).
107. Id. at 871.
108. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1985).
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exercised reasonable diligence to find comparable employment are
other factors that courts may use to evaluate the mitigation of front
pay awards. Consequently, because of the uncertaintity and speculative
nature of future damages, front pay determinations necessarily are
based on nothing more than educated assumptions. For this reason,
future damage awards often have been criticized. 109
The court, not the jury, is best suited to grapple with the complex
issues involved with the determination of an award of front pay. If
front pay awards were left to the jury's discretion, the speculative na-
ture of such damages might allow the aggrieved party to collect a wind-
fall, instead of returning them to the position in which they would
have been had the breach not occurred.1 0 Accordingly, the court, not
the jury, should determine the appropriateness and amount of front
pay in a breach of handbook case.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to clarify and disseminate company policy to their
workers, employers began issuing employee handbooks; they were una-
ware that issuance of the handbooks could create an employment con-
tract. Despite initial confusion caused by an abrupt reversal of state
public policy, the supreme court's decision to hold employers to poli-
cies and promises made in employee handbooks was in accordance with
the majority of courts across the country. Today, the majority view is
that employees have a right to rely on promises made by management,
who, in turn, should not be allowed to ignore such promises.""" South
Carolina courts have allowed employers the means to issue general
statements of policy without being bound by them or altering the em-
ployees' employment-at-will status. The supreme court in Springs I
stated that in order to accomplish this, an employer may merely insert
"a conspicuous disclaimer or provision into the written document."""
This is a fair rule. The employer may issue nonbinding handbooks, but
the employee will not rely upon their contents if sufficiently fore-
warned by an effective disclaimer.
109. Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1449 (11th Cir. 1985).
110. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 486, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987) (case
remanded on the issue of damages because jury's award of $300,000 was more than the
present value of the actual compensation plaintiff could have received for the rest of her
reasonable working life).
111. As stated by the South Carolina Supreme Court: "It is patently unjust to allow
an employer to couch a handbook, bulletin, or similar material in mandatory terms and
then allow him to ignore these very policies as 'a gratuitous, nonbinding statement of
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If South Carolina decisions were limited to Springs I, the law in
this state would be clear. In order to determine if the handbook consti-
tutes a binding unilateral contract, the parties would apply basic con-
tract principles of offer, acceptance, and consideration. If the court
found that a valid contract existed, the parties would then determine
whether the employer had effectively disclaimed or modified the origi-
nal contract.
This rational approach is muddied, however, by the Toth decision.
Toth follows the basic contract principles above, but may be read to
imply that an employer's promise to continue to employ and pay
wages, after an employee has accepted the modified contract, will not
constitute new consideration to support a modification. Hopefully, the
court's language that the employer "has not designated to the Court
any new consideration the plaintiffs received in return for the modifi-
cation" 113 means only that the defendant did not meet the necessary
burden of proof.
If the court, in fact, believes that the employer's promise to con-
tinue employing and paying wages is insufficient consideration, em-
ployers may find themselves in a situation in which they may never
modify existing handbooks. Employers would discontinue issuing oral
or written guidelines, handbooks, or bulletins in all situations, knowing
that they would be bound virtually forever by their terms. The result
would be detrimental to employers and workers alike because of the
difficulty in achieving consistent treatment regarding employee person-
nel decisions, the potential for increased litigation, the potential for
abuse, and decreased employee morale.
Moreover, if continued employment and wages are not considered
adequate consideration for the modification, the Toth decision would
directly contradict Springs I. In Springs I the company issued a hand-
book to the plaintiff five years after she began work. Nevertheless, the
court found that when the company issued the handbook to the plain-
tiff, the company "altered," or modified, the employee's previous em-
ployment-at-will status.1" 4 The court found that Springs' offer or
promise to continue employing the plaintiff in return for certain bene-
fits and wages was sufficient consideration to support the
modification." 5
113. See Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.S.C. 1989). The court
noted in a footnote that the defendant-employer's Human Resources Manager testified
in a deposition that the plaintiff received no additional consideration. Id. at 1236 n.7.
The footnote does not disclose whether the manager's deposition was received into evi-
dence, nor does it reveal the manager's qualifications and basis for drawing such a legal
conclusion. See id.
114. See Springs I, 292 S.C. at 484, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
115. Id. at 484-85, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
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Another problem raised by Springs I, but not addressed by
Toth, 16 is what constitutes "a conspicuous disclaimer or provision
117
that would effectively render handbook provisions purely advisory
statements. This issue was addressed, however, by the South Carolina
District Court in Nettles v. Techplan, Corp."" In this case the plain-
tiff, after being terminated in June 1987, filed suit against his employer
for, among other causes of action, breach of contract for failing to fol-
low the terms of its personnel manual. The manual contained the fol-
lowing disclaimer: "This Personnel Policy and Practices Manual does
not constitute an employment agreement or contact of employment.
Within applicable state and federal laws, both you, the employee, and
[the employer] each have the right to terminate your employment at
any time for any reason."""
The defendants contended the disclaimer was sufficiently conspic-
uous to defeat any claim the plaintiff brought based on the manual.
The disclaimer was located in the second numbered paragraph of the
first page and was of the same color and print size as the rest of the
manual.
1 20
The court looked for guidance to the Uniform Commercial Code,
which also mandates that the disclaimer be conspicuous. 21 South Car-
olina Code section 36-1-201(10) states that for a contractual clause to
be conspicuous, it must be written so that "a reasonable person against
116, The disclaimer in Toth merely stated, "This booklet is not intended to create
any contractual rights in favor of the employee or Company. The Company reserves the
right to change the terms of this booklet at any time." Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1234. The
court did not reach the issue of whether the disclaimer was "conspicuous" so as to bring
the employees' attention to the provision.
117. The Springs I opinion stated:
If an employer wishes to issue policies, manuals, or bulletins as purely advisory
statements with no intent of being bound by them and with the desire to con-
tinue under the employment at will policy, he is certainly free to do so. This
could be accomplished merely by inserting a conspicuous disclaimer or provi-
sion into the written document.
292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
118. 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988).
119. Id. at 96.
120. Id. at 97.
121. See South Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which states:
[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of
it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the ex-
clusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude the implied
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose must be spe-
cific, and if the inclusion of such language creates an ambiguity in the contract
as a whole it shall be resolved against the seller.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.' 12 2 The court in Nettles
noted that South Carolina courts addressing the issue of "conspicuous"
under the purview of the U.C.C. consider three factors to determine
whether a disclaimer is conspicuous: (1) the type setting of the dis-
claimer; (2) the color of the print of the disclaimer; and (3) the location
of the disclaimer. 123 The determination of whether a clause is conspicu-
ous or not is made by the court. 24
The Nettles court ultimately held that the disclaimer contained in
the defendant's personnel manual located in a separate paragraph on
the first page was sufficiently conspicuous "such that a reasonable per-
son against whom it is to operate should have noticed it."'"25
A final area of uncertainty in breach of handbook cases concerns
future damages. It is clear that any award of front pay would be in lieu
of an award of reinstatement. The remedy of reinstatement is equita-
ble in nature, and therefore, it follows that the substitute for reinstate-
ment, front pay, should also be an equitable remedy to be determined
by the court. From a practical standpoint, due to the speculative na-
ture of claims for front pay and the many complex issues involved in
determining the appropriateness and amount of front pay, the court,
not the jury, should decide the appropriateness and amount of front
pay.
Employers should carefully consider their policies before promul-
gating handbooks or other policy guides for employees to follow and
rely upon. Otherwise, the employers' reasons to issue these policy
guides-increased morale, employer compassion, and understanding
between the parties-are rendered meaningless. On the other hand, if
employers, due to unforeseen changes and circumstances, wish to mod-
ify their handbooks, they should be allowed to do so if they follow cer-
tain guidelines. The employer must make the employees aware of the
changes 26 and allow them to decide whether or not to continue work-
122. Id. § 36-1-201(10); see also Nettles, 704 F. Supp. at 97.
123. Nettles, 704 F. Supp. at 98.
124. Id. at 97; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(10) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
125. 704 F. Supp. at 98; see also Prezzy v. Food Lion, Inc., 4 I.E.R. (BNA) 996
(D.S.C. 1989) (disclaimer appearing as a separate paragraph on an introductory page is
sufficiently conspicuous to bar plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action against em-
ployer, even though disclaimer was the same type as remainder of handbook). For deci-
sions analyzing the effectiveness of a disclaimer in a buyer-seller context, see Investor
Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974) (disclaimer placed in a
separate paragraph and set out in all capital letters was effective) and Cooley v. Salopian
Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974) (disclaimer buried in the text of a lengthy
paragraph and not contrasting in type or color did not meet the requirements of this
section).
126. In Toth all plaintiffs admitted that they received the revised handbook con-
taining the disclaimer and that they signed an acknowledgement of its receipt, stating
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ing after the changes are made.
If an employer wishes to disclaim any portion of the handbook,
however, it should bring the disclaimer to the employees' attention
both orally, when issuing the handbook, and in writing, by conspicu-
ously including a disclaimer following the Uniform Commercial Code
guidelines. As South Carolina law now stands, both employers and em-
ployees will lose until the courts or legislature clearly define what is
required to disclaim or modify an employee handbook. Until that time,
employers issue handbooks at their own risk, never sure of the outcome
if they later attempt to disclaim any portion of the contents.
that they understood their responsibility to read and understand its contents. Toth v.
Square D Co., 312 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D.S.C. 1989).
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